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Abstract. The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest exten-
sions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation prob-
lem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas
to fill. Here we investigate the case of uncoordinated processes in stable
allocation instances. In this setting, a feasible allocation is given and the
aim is to reach a stable allocation by raising the value of the allocation
along blocking edges and reducing it on worse edges if needed. Do such
myopic changes lead to a stable solution?
In our present work, we analyze both better and best response dynamics
from an algorithmic point of view. With the help of two determinis-
tic algorithms we show that random procedures reach a stable solution
with probability one for all rational input data in both cases. Surpris-
ingly, while there is a polynomial path to stability when better response
strategies are played (even for irrational input data), the more intuitive
best response steps may require exponential time. We also study the spe-
cial case of correlated markets. There, random best response strategies
lead to a stable allocation in expected polynomial time.
Keywords. stable matching, stable allocation, paths to stability, best
response strategy, better response strategy, correlated market
1 Introduction
Matching markets without prices model various real-life problems such as, e. g.,
employee placement, task scheduling or kidney donor matching. Research on
those markets focuses on maximizing social welfare instead of profit. Stability is
probably the most widely used optimality criterion in that case.
Finding equilibria in markets that lack a central authority of control is an-
other widely studied, challenging task. Besides modeling uncoordinated markets,
like third-generation (3G) wireless data networks [10], selfish and uncontrolled
agents can also represent modifications in coordinated markets, e. g., the arrival
of a new participant or slightly changed preferences [4]. In our present work, those
two topics are combined: we study uncoordinated capacitated matching markets.
1.1 Stability in matching markets
The theory of stable matchings has been investigated for decades. Gale and Shap-
ley [9] introduced the notion of stability on their well-known stable marriage
problem. An instance of this problem consists of a bipartite graph where color
classes symbolize men and women, respectively. Each participant has a prefer-
ence list of their acquaintances of the opposite gender. A set of marriages (a
matching) is stable, if no pair blocks it. A blocking pair is an unmarried pair
so that the man is single or he prefers the woman to his current wife and vice
versa, the woman is single or she prefers the man to her current husband. The
Gale-Shapley algorithm was the first proof for the existence of stable matchings.
A natural extension of matching problems arises when capacities are intro-
duced. The stable allocation problem is defined in a bipartite graph with edge
capacities and quotas on vertices. The exact problem formulation and a detailed
example are provided in Section 2.
1.2 Better and best response steps in uncoordinated markets
Central planning is needed in order to produce a stable solution with the Gale-
Shapley algorithm. In many real-life situations, however, such a coordination is
not available. Agents play their selfish strategy, trying to reach the best possible
solution. A path to stability is a series of myopic operations. The intuitive picture
of a myopic operation is the following. If a man and a woman block a marriage
scheme, then they both agree to form a couple together, even if they divorce
their current partners to that end. This step may induce new blocking pairs.
Such changes are made until a stable matching is reached.
Note that stability is naturally a desirable property of uncoordinated mar-
kets. A stable matching seems to be the best reachable solution for all partici-
pants, because they cannot find any partnership that could improve their own
position.
The study of uncoordinated matching processes has a long history. In the case
of one-to-one matchings, two different concepts have been studied: better and best
response dynamics. One of the color classes is chosen to be the active side. These
vertices submit proposals to the passive vertices. According to best response dy-
namics, the best blocking edge of an active vertex is chosen to perform myopic
changes along. In better response dynamics, any blocking edge can play this role.
The core questions regarding uncoordinated processes rise naturally. Can a
series of myopic changes result in returning back to the same unstable matching?
If yes, is there a way to reach a stable solution? How do random procedures
behave? The first question about uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
was brought up by Knuth [13] in 1976. He also gives an example of a matching
problem where better response dynamics cycle. More than a decade later, Roth
and Vande Vate [15] came up with the next result on the topic. They show that
random better response dynamics converge to a stable matching with probability
one. Analogous results for best response dynamics were published in 2011 by
Ackermann et al. [2]. They also show an instance in which best response dynamics
cycle give a deterministic algorithm for reaching a stable solution in polynomial
time and prove that the convergence time is exponential in both random cases.
Example for a best response cycle on a matching instance [2]. Starting
with the unstable matching (j2m2, j3m3), and saturating the blocking edges
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j1m3, j2m1, j3m1, j1m2, j2m2, j3m3 in this order leads back to the same unstable
matching. In each round, the chosen blocking edge is the best blocking edge of
its job.
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Fig. 1. A cycle of best response blocking edges
Besides these works on the classical stable marriage problem, there is a num-
ber of papers investigating variants of it from the paths-to-stability point of view.
For the stable roommates problem, the non-bipartite version of the stable mar-
riage problem, it is known that there is a series of myopic operations that leads to
a stable solution, if one exists [7]. A path to stability also exists in the bipartite
matching case with payments where flexible salaries and productivity are taken
into account [5]. In the hospitals/residents assignment problem, when couples
are present, the existence of such a path is only guaranteed if the preferences
are weakly responsive [12]. Weak responsiveness ensures consistence between the
preferences of each partner and the couple’s preference list on pairs of hospitals.
In many-to-many markets, supposing substitutable preferences on one side and
responsive preferences on the other side, a path to stability can be found [14].
Both substitutable and responsive preferences are defined in instances where
preferences are given on sets of vertices. Although many variants of the stable
marriage problem have been studied, no paper discusses the case of allocations
(instead of matchings or b-matchings), where edges are capacitated, thus, they
can be partially in stable solutions. Our present work makes an attempt to fill
this gap in the literature.
Structure of the paper In the next section, the essential theoretical basis is pro-
vided: stable allocations, and better and best response modifications on such
instances are defined. In Section 3, a special case of allocation instances are in-
vestigated. We show that although random best response processes generally run
in exponential time, in the case of correlated markets, polynomial convergence
is expected. Better and best response dynamics in the general case on ratio-
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nal input are extensively studied in Section 4. We describe two deterministic
algorithms that generalize the result of Ackermann et al. on one-to-one match-
ing markets to stable allocation instances and also show algorithmic differences
between the two strategies. In the case of random procedures, convergence is
shown for both strategies. Section 5 focuses on running time efficiency. There, a
better response algorithm is presented that terminates with a stable solution in
O(|V |2|E|) time, even for irrational input data. A counterexample proves that
such an acceleration for the best response dynamics cannot be reached.
shortest path to stability random path to stability
best response dynamics exponential length converges with probability 1
better response dynamics polynomial length converges with probability 1
Table 1. Our results for rational input
Applied to a matching instance, our best-response algorithm performs the
same steps as the two-phase best response algorithm of Ackermann et al. Our
better-response variant can also be interpreted as an extended version of the
above mentioned method. The only difference is that while our first phase is
better response, theirs is best response. However, this seems to be a minor dif-
ference, as their proof is also valid for a better response first phase, and our proof
still holds if only best blocking edges are chosen. Moreover, stable allocations
might be the most complex model in which this approach brings results. The
most intuitive extension of Ackermann’s algorithm for stable flows [8] does not
even result in feasible myopic changes.
On the other hand, our accelerated better-response algorithm generalizes an-
other known method. Applied directly to the instance with the empty allocation,
the accelerated Phase II performs augmentations like the augmenting path algo-
rithms of Baïou and Balinski, and of Dean and Munshi. Since our algorithm is
an accelerated version of our first algorithm, our concept offers a bridge between
two known methods for solving two completely different problems, providing a
solution to both of them.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Stable allocations
The marriage problem has been extended in several directions. A great deal of
research effort has been spent on many-to-one and many-to-many matchings,
sometimes also referred to as b-matchings. Their extension is called the stable
allocation problem, also known as the ordinal transportation problem, since it
is a direct analog of the classical cost-based transportation problem. In this
problem, the vertices of a bipartite graph G = (V,E) have quotas q : V → R≥0,
while edges have capacities c : E → R≥0. Both functions are real-valued, unlike
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the respective functions in many-to-many instances, where capacities are unit,
while quotas are integer-valued. Therefore, allocations can model more complex
problems, for example where goods can be divided unequally between agents. In
order to avoid confusion caused by terms associated with the marriage model, we
call the vertices of the first color class jobs and the remaining vertices machines.
For each machine, its quota is the maximal time spent working. A job’s quota
is the total time that machines must spend on the job in order to complete it.
In addition, machines have a limit on the time spent on a specific job; this is
modeled by edge capacities. A feasible allocation is a set of contracts where no
machine is overwhelmed and no job is worked on after it has been completed.
Definition 1 (allocation). Function x : E → R≥0 is called an allocation if
both of the following hold for every edge e ∈ E and every vertex v ∈ V of G:
1. x(e) ≤ c(e);
2. x(v) :=
∑
e∈δ(v) x(e) ≤ q(v), where δ(v) is the set of edges incident to v.
To define stability we need preference lists as well. All vertices rank their
incident edges strictly. Vertex v prefers uv to wv, if uv has a lower rank on
v’s preference list than wv: rankv(uv) < rankv(wv). In this case we say that
uv dominates wv at v. A stable allocation instance consists of four elements:
I = (G, q, c, O), where O is the set of all preference lists.
Definition 2 (blocking edge, stable allocation). An allocation x is blocked
by an edge jm if all of the following properties hold:
1. x(jm) < c(jm);
2. x(j) < q(j) or j prefers jm to its worst edge with positive value in x;
3. x(m) < q(m) or m prefers jm to its worst edge with positive value in x.
A feasible allocation is stable if no edge blocks it.
In other words, edge jm is blocking if it is unsaturated and neither end
vertices of jm could fill up its quota with at least as good edges as jm. If an
unsaturated edge fulfills the second criterion, then we say that it dominates x
at j. Similarly, if the third criterion is fulfilled, then we talk about an edge
dominating x at m.
Example for a stable allocation instance. The figure below illustrates a
stable allocation instance. We use the same example throughout the entire paper
to demonstrate different notions defined here. For the sake of simplicity, all
edge capacities are unit. The numbers over and under the vertices represent the
quota function. The preferences can be seen on the edges: the more preferred
edges carry a higher rank, a smaller number. For example, machine m1’s most
preferred job is j2, its second choice is j3, while its least preferred, but still
acceptable job is j1. The function x = 1 on the thick edges and x = 0 on the
remaining edges is a feasible allocation, since no quota or capacity constraint is
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harmed. The unique blocking edge is easy to find: j3m1 blocks x, because it is
unsaturated and both end vertices have some free quota.
j3
1.9
j4
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Fig. 2. Feasible, but unstable allocation
Baïou and Balinski [3] prove that stable allocations always exist. They also
give two algorithms for finding them, an extended version of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm and an inductive algorithm. The worst case running time of the first
algorithm is exponential, but the latter one runs in strongly polynomial time.
Dean and Munshi [6] speed up the polynomial algorithm using sophisticated data
structures: their version runs in O(|E| log |V |) time for any real-valued instance.
2.2 Better and best response steps for allocations
First, we provide some basic definitions and notations we will use throughout
the entire paper. A feasible, but possibly unstable allocation x is given at the
beginning, the instance can be written as I= (G, q, c, O, x). Increasing x along a
blocking edge and possibly decreasing it along worse edges is a better response
step: through this operation, both end vertices of the blocking edge come better
off. The definition of better and best response strategies is not as straightforward
as it is in the matching instance with unit quotas and capacities. Here, the
possible outcomes of a player are ordered lexicographically.
Although lexicographical order seems to be a natural choice, it is somewhat
against the convention when discussing stable allocations. In most cases, when
comparing the position of an agent in two stable allocations, the so called min-
min criterion is used [3]. According to this rule, the agent prefers the allocation
in which its worst positive edge is ranked higher. In order to make use of such
an ordering relation, each vertex has to have the same allocation value in all
stable solutions. Therefore here, when studying and comparing arbitrary feasible
allocations, this concept proves to be counter-intuitive.
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In our instance I, jobs form the active side J , while machines M are passive
players. For sake of simplicity we denote the residual capacity c(jm) − x(jm)
of edge jm by x¯(jm) and similarly, the residual quota q(v) − x(v) of vertex v
by x¯(v).
An active player j having some blocking edges is chosen to perform a best
response step on the current allocation x. Amongst j’s blocking edges, let jm
be the one ranked highest on j’s preference list. The aim of player j is to reach
its best possible lexicographical position via increasing x(jm). To this end, j
is ready to allocate all its remaining quota x¯(j) to jm, moreover, it reassigns
allocation from all edges worse than jm to jm. Thus, j aims to increase x(jm)
by x¯(j) + x(edges dominated by jm at j). To preserve feasibility, x(jm) is not
increased by more than x¯(jm). The passive player m agrees to increase x(jm)
as long as it does not lose allocation on better edges. This constraint gives the
third upper bound, x¯(m)+x(edges dominated by jm at m). To summarize this,
in a best response step x(jm) is increased by the following amount.
A := min{x¯(j) + x(edges dominated by jm at j), x¯(jm),
x¯(m) + x(edges dominated by jm at m)}
Once this A and the new x(jm) is determined, j andm fill their remaining quota,
then refuse allocation on their worst allocated edges, until x becomes feasible.
Better response steps are much less complicated to describe. The chosen
active vertex j increases the allocation on an arbitrary blocking edge jm. Both
j and m are allowed to refuse allocation on worse edges than jm. This rule
guarantees that j’s lexicographical situation develops and that the change is
myopic for both vertices. By definition, best response steps are always better
response steps at the same time. The execution of a single better response step
consists of modifications on at most |δ(j)|+ |δ(m)| − 1 ≤ |V | − 1 edges.
In our example above, j3 andm1 mutually agree to allocate value 1 to j3m1. If
best response strategies are played, m1 refuses 0.2 amount of allocation from j1,
while j3 reduces x(j3m2) to 0.9. Through this step, they induce blocking some-
where else in G: now j4m2 blocks the new x, because m2 lost some allocation.
Thus, another myopic change would be to increase x(j4m2), and so on. A better
response step of the same vertex j3 would be for example to increase x(j3m1) to
1, while refusing j3m2 entirely. To keep feasibility, m1 has to refuse 0.2 amount
of allocation from j1.
3 Correlated markets
Before tackling the general paths to stability problem, we first restrict ourselves
to instances with special preference profiles. In this section, we study the case of
stable allocations on an uncoordinated market with correlated preferences. Later
we will prove that the convergence time of random best and better response
strategies is exponential on general instances. By contrast, here we show that
on correlated markets, random best response strategies terminate in expected
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polynomial time, even in the presence of irrational data. At the end of this
section we also elaborate on the behavior of better response dynamics.
Definition 3 (correlated market). An allocation instance is correlated, if
there is a function f : E → N such that rankv(uv) < rankv(wv) if f(uv) < f(wv)
for every u, v, w ∈ V and no two edges have the same f value.
Correlated markets are also called instances with globally ranked pairs or
acyclic markets. The latter property means that there is no cycle of edges such
that every edge is preferred to the previous one by their common vertex. Abra-
ham et al. [1] show that acyclic markets are correlated and vice versa. The graph
pictured on Figure 2 is not correlated: edges (j3m3, j4m3, j4m2, j3m2) build a
preference cycle. Ackermann et al. [2] were the first to prove that random better
and best response dynamics reach a stable matching on correlated markets in
expected polynomial time. Using a similar argumentation, we extend their result
to allocation instances.
Theorem 1. On correlated allocation instances with real-valued input data, ran-
dom best response dynamics reach a stable solution in expected time O(|V |2|E|).
Proof. Before studying paths to stability we show that on correlated instances,
the set of solutions has cardinality one. There is an absolute minimum of f(jm).
The single edge jm with this minimal f value must be in all stable allocations
with value min {c(jm), q(j), q(m)}, otherwise it is blocking. Fixing x on jm and
decreasing the quotas of j and m respectively leads to another correlated al-
location instance. On this instance, the stable solutions are exactly the stable
solutions of the original instance without jm. This leads to an inductive algo-
rithm that proves that there is a unique stable allocation on correlated markets.
We will show that random best response dynamics reach this unique solution in
expected polynomial time.
Whenever a job j with an unsaturated edge jm of an absolute minimal
f(jm) is chosen to submit an offer, its best response strategy is to increase x
on jm. Due to this single best response operation performed by j, x(jm) =
min {c(jm), q(j), q(m)} is reached. The probability that a vertex j ∈ J is chosen
to take the next step is at least 1|J| . As mentioned above, one best response
step requires at most O(|V |) modifications. Thus, in order to reach x(jm) =
min {c(jm), q(j), q(m)} on the best edge in G, |J | · |V | ∼ O(|V |2) modifications
are needed in expected time. After this jm with minimal f value reached its final
position in the unique stable allocation, x(jm) will never be reduced, because
neither j, norm have a better neighboring edge. Thus, x(jm) can be fixed, and a
new minimum of f can be chosen for the same procedure as before. The number
of iterations is bounded from above by the number of edges in the graph. The
unique stable allocation is reached this way in O(|V |2|E|) time in expectation.
In order to establish a similar result for better response dynamics in real-
valued instances, an exact interpretation of random events would be needed. In
the matching case, best and better response dynamics differ exclusively in the
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rank of the chosen blocking edge: when playing best response strategy, the best
blocking edge is chosen by an active vertex j. In contrast to this, here, better
response steps differ also in the amount of modification and in the edges chosen
to refuse allocation along. The first factor indicates a continuous sample space.
If we assume that any better response step results in reassigning the highest
possible allocation value to an arbitrary blocking edge, an analogous proof can
be derived. The only difference is that after j is chosen, the expected time of
reaching x(jm) = min {c(jm), q(j), q(m)} is larger. In this case, j chooses jm
with probability at least 1|δ(j)| . This implies that reaching the stable allocation
value on the best edge takes |δ(j)| · (|δ(j)| + |δ(m)| − 1) ∼ O(|V |2) steps in
expectation. In total, for all vertices j ∈ J and all edges the algorithm takes
O(|V |3|E|) steps in expectation.
4 Best and better responses with rational data
In this section, the case of allocations on an uncoordinated market with rational
data is studied. As already mentioned, better and best response dynamics can
cycle in such instances. We describe two deterministic methods, a better-response
and a best-response algorithm that yield stable allocations in finite time. The
main idea of our algorithms is to distinguish between blocking edges based on
the type of blocking at the job: dominance or free quota.
A blocking edge can be of two types. Recall point 2 of Definition 2: if jm
blocks x, then x(j) < q(j) or j prefers jm to its worst edge with positive value
in x. We talk about blocking of type I in the latter case, if jm blocks x because
j prefers jm to its worst edge having positive value in x. Blocking of type II
means that j has no allocated edge worse than jm, but j has not filled up its
quota yet, x(j) < q(j). Note that the reason of the blocking property at m is
not involved when defining the two groups.
4.1 Better response dynamics
First, we provide a deterministic algorithm that constructs a finite path to stabil-
ity from any feasible allocation. In the first phase of our algorithm, only blocking
edges of type I are chosen to perform myopic changes along. The active vertices
(jobs) choose one of their blocking edges of type I, not necessarily the best one.
In all cases, withdrawal is executed along worst allocated edges. The amount
of allocation set to the better edge is determined in such a way that at least
one edge or a vertex becomes saturated or empty. Active vertices replace their
worst edges with better ones, even if they had free quota. When no blocking
edge of type I remains, the second phase starts. The allocation value is increased
on blocking edges of type II such that they cease to be blocking. The runtime
of our algorithm is exponential. Later, in Section 5 we will also show that this
algorithm can be accelerated such that a stable solution is reached in polynomial
time. The detailed proof of correctness, a pseudocode and execution on a sample
instance are also provided.
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Theorem 2. For every allocation instance with rational data and a given fea-
sible allocation x, there is a finite sequence of better responses that leads to a
stable allocation.
The main idea of the proof is the following. We need to keep track of the
change in total allocation value and in the lexicographical position of the active
vertices simultaneously. In one step of the first phase along edge jm, either both
j and m refuse edges, thus, the allocation value |x| =
∑
j∈J x(j) decreases, or
only j does so, keeping |x| and improving its situation lexicographically. Since
both procedures are monotone and the second one does not impair the first one,
the first phase terminates. Termination for the second phase is implied by the
fact that passive vertices improve their lexicographical situation in each step.
Proof. Recall our example on Figure 2. The unique blocking edge j3m1 is of
type I, because j3, its active vertex prefers edge j3m1 to its worst allocated
edge j3m2.
In the first phase, the jobs propose along arbitrary blocking edges of type I.
We will show that this process ends with an allocation where no job has a block-
ing edge of type I. In the second phase, the jobs propose along their best blocking
edges of type II. Later we will see that during this phase until termination, no
job gets a blocking edge of type I. A pseudocode is provided after the description
of both phases.
First phase. In one step, an arbitrary blocking edge jm of type I is cho-
sen. Both end vertices, j and m may refuse some allocation along edges when
increasing x on jm. Job j has a refusal pointer r(j) that denotes the worst
allocated edge to j, if any exists. Similarly, r(m) stands for the worst cur-
rently allocated edge of m. A step of Phase I consists of two or three opera-
tions, each along jm, r(j) and possibly along r(m). Two operations take place,
if m has not filled up its quota yet. In this case, x(r(j)) will be decreased by
A = min {x(r(j)), x¯(jm), x¯(m)}. At the same time, x(jm) is increased by the
same amount. Depending on which expression is the minimal one, edge r(j)
becomes empty or jm becomes saturated or m fills up its quota. Note that
r(m) plays no role, because m does not aim to refuse any allocation. In the
remaining case, if m has a full quota, three operations take place, since m
has to refuse some allocation. The amount of allocation we deal with is now
A = min {x(r(j)), x¯(jm), x(r(m))}. The allocation on the blocking edge jm will
be increased by this A, on the other two edges it will be decreased by A, until
one of them becomes empty or saturated. We emphasize that whenever a job
j with free quota adds a new edge better than its worst allocated edge to x, it
withdraws some allocation from the worst edge. This is what we earlier phrased
as freezing quotas: in Phase I, j acts as if q(j) would be the current allocation
value x(j).
We return to our example again. It has already been mentioned that the
unique blocking edge j3m1 is of type I. The refusal pointer r(j3) is j3m2.
Since m1 has not filled up its quota yet, its refusal pointer j1m1 is irrele-
vant at the moment. Due to the same reason, two operations take place. The
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amount we augment with is min {x(j3m2), x¯(j3m1), x¯(m1)} = 0.8. After this
operation, x(j3m1) = 0.8, x(j3m2) = 0.2, and j3m1 is still a Phase I block-
ing edge. Since x(m1) = q(m1) holds now, three operations are executed. A =
min {x(j3m2), x¯(j3m1), x(j1m1)} = 0.2. Now j3m1 is saturated, hence it ceases
to be blocking. During the first operation, j4m2 became blocking of type I, be-
cause m2 lost allocation. In the next step, one unit of allocation is reallocated
to j4m2 from j4m3. But then, j3m3 becomes blocking of type I, and so on.
We use the following multicriteria potential function in order to show that
the process does not cycle:
Θ(x) := (Θ1(x), Θ2(x)) :=

∑
j∈J
x(j),
∑
j∈J
∑
jm∈E
x(jm) rankj(jm)


Recall that rankj(jm) stands for the rank of jm on j’s preference list. The
smaller rankj(jm) is, the better m for j is. In the expression above, both com-
ponents are non-negative for any feasible allocation x. They both have an upper
bound as well:
0 ≤ Θ1(x) ≤
∑
jm∈E
c(jm), 0 ≤ Θ2(x) ≤ |J | · max
jm∈E
c(jm) ·max
j∈J
|δ(j)|.
We will show that this function lexicographically decreases in each step of the
procedure. The process terminates if the amount of increment is always greater
than a fixed positive constant. If all data are rational, this is guaranteed.
Considering the potential function, we need to keep track of those two jobs
that proposed or got refused, since the contribution of all other jobs remains the
same. Thus, their terms in the summations of Θ(x) do not change.
As mentioned above, a step consists of either two or three edges changing
their value in x. In the first case, when only two edges change their value in x,
there is only one job j that modifies its contribution. The allocated value of this
vertex remains the same, thus, Θ1(x) does not change. But Θ2(x) does, because
some allocation will move from a less preferred edge to jm. This ensures the
decrement of Θ2(x). In the second case, where three edges are involved, there is
a job j that improves its lexicographical position, and another job j′ that loses
allocation. The effect of the first change at j is just as above, Θ1(x) remains the
same, Θ2(x) decreases. Losing allocation for j′ means that both terms decrease,
since x(j′) decreases.
Second phase. In the second phase, we work with the original quota func-
tion. When developing the allocation along a blocking edge jm of type II, m
may refuse some allocation, but j may not, since the reason of blocking is that j
has not filled up its (original) quota yet. Thus, we do not need the pointer r(j)
any more. One step consists of changes along one edge if x(m) < q(m), or along
two edges otherwise. If m has not filled up its quota yet, then we simply assign
as much allocation to jm as possible without exceeding q(j), q(m) or c(jm). If
m has to refuse something from a job j′ in order to accept better offers from j,
we improve m’s position until j′m becomes empty or jm becomes saturated or
j gets its quota filled up.
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First, we need to see that no step can induce a blocking edge of type I.
One step in Phase II leaves all vertices but j,m and the possibly refused j′
unchanged. Thus, if there is a blocking edge of type I after the modification, it
must be incident to one of those vertices. The three cases are the following.
j′′ j j′
m m′
32
2
1
1
Fig. 3. Edges affected by one myopic operation
– j′′m blocks x. The position of m became lexicographically better, thus, no
new blocking edge incident to m could be introduced. The existing blocking
edges j′′m of type II cannot become of type I, because j′′’s position remained
unchanged.
– jm′ (or jm) blocks x. The only change at j is that x(jm) increases, thus,
j also develops its lexicographical position. From this follows that no new
blocking edge incident to j appeared. Blocking edges of type II change their
type of blocking if j increased its allocation on a worse edge. This is the
point where we use the rule of choosing the best blocking edge in Phase II
as jm, which contradicts to this assumption.
– j′m′ (or j′m) blocks x. The only change in j′’s neighborhood is that x(j′m)
decreases. After this step, consider an unsaturated edge j′m′ preferred by
j′ to its worst allocated edge. Since no machine worsens its lexicographical
position in Phase II, if j′m′ dominates the new allocation x, it already dom-
inated the previous allocation. Thus, j′m′ must have been a blocking edge
prior to the modification.
From this we see that once Phase II has started, Phase I can never return.
The last step ahead of us is to show that Phase II may not cycle. But this
follows from the fact that in each step exactly one machine strictly improves its
lexicographical situation, while all other machines maintain the same allocation
as before. In case of a rational input, this improvement is bounded from below,
thus, the second phase of the algorithm terminates.
12
Algorithm Two-phase better response algorithm
while ∃j ∈ J with a blocking edge of type I do
Improvement I(j)
end while
while ∃j ∈ J with a blocking edge of type II do
Improvement II(j)
end while
procedure Improvement I(j)
jm← blocking edge of type I of j
if x(m) < q(m) then
A := min {x(r(j)), x¯(jm), x¯(m)}
x(r(j)) := x(r(j))− A
x(jm) := x(jm) + A
else
A := min {x(r(j)), x¯(jm), x(r(m))}
x(r(j)) := x(r(j))− A
x(jm) := x(jm) + A
x(r(m)) := x(r(m))−A
end if
end procedure
procedure Improvement II(j)
jm← best blocking edge of type II of j
if x(m) < q(m) then
A := min {x¯(jm), x¯(j), x¯(m)}
x(jm) := x(jm) + A
else
A := min {x(r(m)), x¯(jm), x¯(j)}
x(jm) := x(jm) + A
x(r(m)) := x(r(m))− A
end if
end procedure
The duration of both phases strongly depends on the capacities and quotas.
The examples below show two bad instances. The capacity is N on all edges,
where N is an arbitrarily big integer. Quotas are marked above and below the
vertices. The initial allocation for Phase I is N on j1m1 and on j2m2 and zero
on the remaining two edges. The first phase performs N augmenting steps along
the same cycle. Phase II terminates after N iterations in the second instance,
starting with the empty allocation.
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Fig. 4. Worst-case instances
This algorithm also proves an important result regarding rational random
better response processes. If the input is rational (there is a smallest positive
number that can be represented as a linear combination of all data), it is clearly
worthwhile to restrict the set of feasible better response modifications to the
ones that reassign a multiple of this unit. For this reason, the set of reachable
allocations is finite and they can be seen as states of a discrete time Markov
chain. Our algorithm proves that from any state there is a finite path to an
absorbing state with positive probability.
Theorem 3. In the rational case, random better response strategies terminate
with a stable allocation with probability one.
Polynomial time convergence cannot be shown, since better response strate-
gies need exponential time to converge even in matching instances [2].
4.2 Best response dynamics
In this subsection, we derive analogous results for best response modifications
to the ones established for better response strategies. The main difference from
the algorithmic point of view is that instances can be found in which no se-
ries of best response strategies terminate with a stable solution in polynomial
time. A small example resembles the instance given by Baïou and Balinski [3]
to prove that the Gale-Shapley algorithm requires exponential time to termi-
nate in stable allocation instances. Let G be a complete bipartite graph on four
vertices, with quota q(j1) = N + 1, q(j2) = q(m1) = q(m2) = N and initial
allocation x(j1m1) = x(j2m2) = N for an arbitrary large number N . If the
preference profile is chosen to be cyclic, such that rankj1(m1) = rankj2(m2) =
rankm1(j2) = rankm2(j1) = 1, the unique series of best-response steps consists
of 2N operations. A path of exponential length to stability can still be found.
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Theorem 4. For every allocation instance with rational data and a given feasi-
ble allocation x, there is a finite sequence of best responses that leads to a stable
allocation.
Proof. Similarly to our method for better response strategies, here we prove that
there is a two-phase algorithm that terminates with a stable solution.
All blocking edges we take into account are best blocking edges of their
job j. Depending on their rank compared to j’s worst allocated edge r(j), they
are either of type I or type II. A job j’s best blocking edge jm is
– of type I(a), if rankj(jm) < rankj r(j) and
x¯(j) < min {x¯(jm), x¯(m) + x(edges dominated by jm at m)};
– of type I(b), if rankj(jm) < rankj r(j) and
x¯(j) ≥ min {x¯(jm), x¯(m) + x(edges dominated by jm at m)};
– of type II, if rankj(jm) ≥ rankj r(j).
The intuitive interpretation of the grouping above is given by the steps needed
to execute when jm is chosen to perform a best response operation along. If
jm is of type I(a), then jm can be saturated without any refusal made by j,
since j has sufficient free quota. On the other hand, if j agrees to reduce x(r(j))
in order to accommodate more allocation on jm, then jm is a blocking edge
of type I(b). The remaining case occurs when jm is worse than r(j), that is, j
accepts as much allocation from m as much free quota it has. In this case, no
rejection is called by j.
In Phase I, only best blocking edges of type I(a) and of I(b) are selected. Then,
when only type II blocking edges remain, Phase II starts. In order to prove finite
termination, we introduce two potential functions, Θ(x) and Ψ . When proving
the termination of the first phase, both of them are used, while the second
phase is discussed by analyzing the behavior of Ψ . The lexicographical position
of machine m is denoted by lex(m).
Θ(x) := (Θ1(x), Θ2(x)) := (rankj(r(j)), x(r(j)))
Ψ(x) := −(lex(m))
Claim. The best response step of job j along edge jm of type I(a) decreasesΘ(x).
Proof. Due to the type-defining characteristics listed above, there is a rejection
on r(j). At the same time, j cannot gain allocation on any edge worse than r(j),
because the only edge on which x is increased is jm.
Claim. The best response step of job j along edge jm of type I(b) decreases
Ψ(x) and does not increase Θ(x).
Proof. Since j does not reject any allocation, x(r(j)) remains unchanged. For
the same reason, no machine loses allocation. The only machine whose position
changes is m itself: it clearly develops its lexicographical position.
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For any rational input data, the change in Θ(x) or Ψ(x) is each round is
bounded from below. Since both functions have an absolute minimum, phase I
terminates in finite time.
Claim. The best response step of job j along edge jm of type II decreases Ψ(x).
Moreover, no edge becomes blocking of type I(a) or I(b).
Proof. During the second phase, no machine loses allocation, thus, their lexico-
graphical position cannot worsen. In addition, lex(m) develops. This also implies
that no edge j′m′ dominates x at m′ that has not already dominated it before
the myopic change. Moreover, edges that lost allocation during that step are the
worst-choice edges of j, hence they cannot be blocking of type I(a) or I(b). If
there is an edge j′m′ that became blocking of type I(a) or I(b), then it is better
than the worst edge in x at j′. These edges were already unsaturated before the
last step and also already dominated x at both end vertices. It contradicts the
fact that best blocking edges are chosen in each step.
The same arguments as above, in Theorem 3, using finite Markov chains
imply the result on random procedures.
Theorem 5. In the rational case, random best response strategies terminate
with a stable allocation with probability one.
5 Irrational data - a strongly polynomial algorithm
In our previous section, we relied several times on the fact that in each step,
x is changed with values greater than a specific positive lower bound. When
irrational data are present, e. g., q, c or x are real-valued functions, this cannot
be guaranteed. Hence, our arguments for termination are not any more valid.
Moreover, both of our algorithms require exponentially many steps to termi-
nate. In this section, we describe a fast version of our two-phase better response
algorithm that terminates in polynomial time with a stable allocation also for
irrational input data. We also give a detailed proof of correctness for the first
phase and show a construction with which all Phase II steps can be interpreted
as Phase I operations on a slightly modified instance.
5.1 Accelerated first phase
The algorithm and the proof of its correctness can be outlined the following
way. A helper graph is built in order to keep track of edges that may gain or
lose some allocation. A potential function is also defined, it stores information
about the structure of the helper graph and the degree of instability of the
current allocation. In the helper graph we are looking for walks to augment
along. The amount of allocation we augment with is specified in such a way
that the potential function decreases and the helper graph changes. When using
walks instead of proposal-refusal triplets, more than one myopic operation can
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be executed at a time. Moreover, we also keep track of consequences of locally
myopic improvements. For example, we spare running time by avoiding reducing
allocation on edges that later become blocking anyway.
First, we elaborate on the structure of the helper graph, define alternating
walks and specify the amount augmentation. The method, the proof of correct-
ness, the pseudocode and a sample execution are all described in details here.
Helper graph. Recall that our real-valued input I consists of a stable allocation
instance (G, q, c, O) and a feasible allocation x. First, we define a helper graph
H(x) on the same vertices asG. This graph is dependent on the current allocation
x and will be changed whenever we modify x. The edge set ofH(x) is partitioned
into three disjoint subsets. The first subset P is the set of Phase I blocking
edges. Each job j that has at least one edge with positive x value, also has
a worst allocated edge, r(j). These are the edges jobs tend to reduce x along
when a myopic change is made. These refusal pointers form R, the second subset
of E(H(x)). We also keep track of edges that are currently not of blocking type I,
but later on they may enter set P . This last subset P ′ consists of edges that may
become blocking of type I after some myopic changes. An edge jm /∈ P has to
fulfill three criteria in order to belong to P ′: 1) c(jm) > x(jm); 2) m has at
least one refusal edge; 3) j prefers jm to its worst allocated edge r(j). Such an
edge immediately becomes blocking if m loses allocation along one of its refusal
edges. Edges in P ′ are called possibly blocking edges, the set P ∪P ′ forms the set
of proposal edges. Note that a job j may have several edges in P and P ′, but at
most one in R. Moreover, if j has a proposal edge in H(x), it also has an edge
in R. Regarding the machines, if m has a P ′-edge, it also has an R-edge. The
following lemma provides an additional structural property of H(x).
Lemma 1. If jm ∈ P and j′m ∈ P ′, then rankm(jm) < rankm(j′m).
That is,blocking edges are preferred to possibly blocking edges by their common
machine m.
Proof. Since jm ∈ P is a blocking edge of type I, jm dominates x at m. If
the statement is false, then rankm(jm) > rankm(j′m) for some unsaturated
edge j′m that is better than the worst allocated edge of j′. But then also j′m
dominates x at m. This, together with the first and last properties of possibly
blocking edges would imply that j′m ∈ P .
Once again we return to our example shown on Figure 2. The only blocking
edge j3m1 alone forms P . R contains all four edges with positive allocation value:
j1m1, j2m1, j3m2 and j4m3. Edges j3m3 and j4m2 are possibly blocking. Thus,
in this case, G = H(x).
Alternating walks. Our algorithm performs augmentations along alternating
walks, so that the allocation value of the refusal edges decreases, while the value
of proposal edges increases. This is done in such a way that R, P or P ′ (and
thus, H(x)) changes. The main idea behind these operations is the same we used
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in our previous proof: reassigning allocation to blocking edges from worse edges,
such that the procedure is monotone. The difference between the two methods
is that while our first algorithm tackles a single blocking edge in each step, here
we deal with a set of blocking edges (forming the alternating walk) at once.
When choosing the alternating proposal-refusal walk W to augment along,
the following rules have to be observed:
1. The first edge jm1 is a P -edge.
2. P and P ′-edges are added to W together with the refusal edge they are
incident with on the active side.
3. Machines choose their best P or P ′-edge.
4. W ends at m if 1) m has no proposal edge or 2) its best proposal edge goes
to a vertex already visited by W .
As long as there is a blocking edge of type I, the first edge jm1 of such a
walk can always be found. Lemma 1 guarantees that point 3 is not harmed by
this jm1. After taking r(j), all that remains is to continue on best proposal edges
of machines and refusal edges of jobs they end at. Since G is a finite set, either of
the cases listed in point 4 will appear. According to these rules, proposal-refusal
edge pairs are added to the current path until 1) there is no pair to add or 2) the
path reaches a vertex already visited. In the first case,W is a path. In the latter
case, W is a union of a path and a cycle, connecting at exactly one vertex. This
vertex is the last vertex listed on W , where our method halts, observing point 4.
W can be, of course, a single path or a single cycle as well.
Before elaborating on the amount of augmentation, we emphasize that W is
just a subset of the set of edges whose x value changes during an augmentation
step. The goal is to reassign allocation from refusal edges to blocking edges, until
a stable solution is derived. Naturally, on an alternating walk, refusal edges lose
the same amount of allocation proposal edges gain. But, except if augmentations
are performed along a single cycle, there is a single machine m1 that gains
allocation in total. In order to preserve feasibility, this machine might have to
refuse allocation on edges not belonging toW . The exact amount of these refusals
is discussed later, together with the amount of augmentation along W . Since
no other vertex gains allocation in an augmentation step, feasibility cannot be
harmed elsewhere. Thus, these are the only edges not on W that are modified.
By contrast, if the augmentation is performed along a single cycle C, refusals
only happen on r(j) ∈ W ∩ R edges. Even if the machine m1 that started C
has a full quota, it does not need to refuse any allocation, since x(m1) remains
unchanged during the augmentation. Note that executing several local myopic
steps greedily, like in our first algorithm, would lead to a different output. Then,
m1 would refuse edges, not knowing that it loses allocation later. As a result of
that,m1 would go under its quota, and would possibly create new blocking edges.
Both strategies are better response, the difference is that our second algorithm
keeps track of changes made as a consequence of a myopic operation.
Amount of augmentation. Once W is fixed, the amount of allocation A
has to be determined to augment with. It must be chosen so that 1) a feasible
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allocation is derived and 2) at least one refusal edge becomes empty or at least
one proposal edge leaves P ∪P ′. These points guarantee that H(x) changes. To
fulfill these two requirements, the minimum of the following terms is determined.
1. Allocation value on refusal edges along W : x(r(j)), where r(j) ∈W ∩R.
2. Residual capacity on proposal edges along W : x¯(p), x¯(p′), where p, p′ ∈W ∩
(P ∪ P ′).
3. If W is not a single cycle, m1 may refuse sufficient amount of allocation such
that jm1 does not become saturated, but it stops dominating x at m1. In
this case, the residual quota of m1 must be filled up and, in addition, the
sum of allocation value on edges worse than jm1 must be refused. With this,
jm1 becomes the worst allocated edge of a full machine. Until reaching this
point, jm1 may gain x¯(m1) + x(edges dominated by jm1 at m1) amount of
allocation in total.
To summarize this, we augment with A := min{x(r(j)), x¯(p), x¯(p′)|r(j) ∈ W ∩
R, p, p′ ∈ W ∩ (P ∪ P ′)} if W is a cycle, because then the last case with the
starting vertex m1 may not occur. Otherwise, the amount of augmentation is
A := min{x(r(j)), x¯(p), x¯(p′), x¯(m1) + x(edges dominated by jm1 at m1)|r(j) ∈
W ∩R, p, p′ ∈W ∩ (P ∪ P ′)}.
The second phase of our method can be interpreted as the execution of the
first phase on a modified instance. The modification needed consist of introducing
a dummy job and swapping the roles of the active and passive color classes.
In total, the algorithm performs O(|V ||E|) rounds, each of them needs O(|V |)
time to be computed. Thus, it runs in O(|V |2|E|) time. For a detailed proof of
correctness and runtime computation, see the proof below.
Theorem 6. For every real-valued allocation instance and given feasible allo-
cation, there is a sequence of better responses leading to a stable allocation in
O(|V |2|E|) time.
Proof. Potential function. We show with the help of the following multicri-
teria potential function that the procedure is monotone and finite:
Θ(x) := (Θ1(x), Θ2(x)) := (rankj(r(j)),− rankm(best proposal edge at m)) .
The first component is a vector of |J | entries. The ith of them is associated
to the ith job of the instance and contains the rank of the worst allocated edge
of this job. If there is no allocated edge, rankj(r(j)) can be interpreted as a
large number, for example as |M | + 1. The second component is also a vector,
containing one element for each machine. This element expresses the rank of the
best proposal edge incident to m. In lack of proposal edges, this term can also
be interpreted as a large constant, for example as |J |+ 1. In order to keep both
terms decreasing, a minus sign is added to this expression.
Each round of our algorithm consists of two operations that change x: pro-
cedure augment and update. First, we prove that the Θ(x) lexicographically
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strictly decreases after each augmentation. Both Θ1 and Θ2 are vectors: decre-
ment means that at least one element of the vector decreases, while no element
increases. For Θ1, such a decrement takes place if no job receives a worse al-
located edge than its current edges, and, in addition, at least one job loses its
worst allocated edge entirely. The second component Θ2 decreases if no machine
receives a proposal edge better than all of its current proposal edges and at least
one machine loses its best proposal edge. As a second step, we will see that the
update operation never increases Θ(x).
Since Θ(x) is a bounded, integer-valued function, any procedure that mod-
ifies it monotonically, is finite. Later, we elaborate on the running time of our
algorithm.
Augmentation. As mentioned above, the our goal here is to show that each
augmentation step decreases Θ(x). The amount of allocation we augment with
depends only on the extreme points of the min function. Recall the three points
we listed when defining the amount of augmentation.
1. x(r(j))
The worst allocated edge of j becomes empty, while x(j) remains unchanged,
hence Θ1(x) decreases.
2. x¯(p) or x¯(p′)
If one of the proposal edges reaches its capacity, it stops being blocking.
Since it was the best blocking edge of its machine, Θ2(x) decreases.
3. In case of walks: x¯(m1) + x(edges dominated by jm1 at m1)
The first blocking edge on W , m1’s best proposal edge ceases to dominate x
at m1, hence Θ2(x) decreases.
Having shown that Θ(x) decreases every time when either of the augmenting
procedures are called, all that remains to show is that the second operation,
updating H(x), does not affect this monotonicity negatively. The vertex set of
H(x) is fix. In the following, we study the three subsets of E(H) separately and
show that updating them never increases Θ(x).
Update R.
Lemma 2. During the accelerated Phase I algorithm, r(j) moves monotonically
on j’s preference list, always pointing to a better machine.
Proof. Suppose that there is a refusal pointer that moved to a worse edge. Since
r(j) is always the worst allocated edge of j, this implies that j increased x along
an edge worse than any of its allocated edges. Allocation is increased only on
proposal edges. Since no proposal edge may be worse than the current refusal
pointer, it is impossible to increase allocation on such an edge during Phase I.
With this lemma we showed that any operation that shifts a refusal pointer
develops our potential function Θ(x). From this point on, we consider a setting
where all refusal pointers are fix. This also implies that Θ1 does not change,
thus, we only concentrate on Θ2.
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Update P . If Θ2(x) increases, then there is a machine m whose best proposal
edge became better. Since the preference lists are fix, this is only possible, if an
edge that was not in P ∪ P ′ becomes blocking or possibly blocking, moreover,
it becomes the best proposal edge of the machine. If it becomes blocking (and
not possibly blocking), then update P adds an edge jm /∈ P ∪P ′ to P . Blocking
edges of type I have to fulfill three criteria, at least one of them was not fulfilled
before the augmentation.
1. jm became unsaturated
– One of the two possibilities for an edge to loose allocation occurs when
jm ∈ W ∩ R. Since jm is already the worst allocated edge of j, it may
not become a blocking edge of type I.
– Even if jm /∈ W , it can lose allocation, but only if x(jm) was reduced
by m = m1, the starting vertex of the alternating walk. It is the only
machine that refuses allocation, and it does so only if A − x¯(m1) > 0.
When the refusal happens, x(m1) = q(m1) andm1 has no worse allocated
edge than jm1. In addition,m1 does not lose any allocation in the current
step. Since q(m1) is full with edges better than jm1, jm1 is not blocking.
2. jm became better than the worst allocated edge of j
Lemma 2 shows that j’s worst allocated edge never becomes worse during
Phase I.
3. jm became better than the worst allocated edge of m or m became unsatu-
rated
– In the first case, m increased x along an edge worse than jm. This worse
edge was in P ∪ P ′, hence jm already dominated x at m or m already
had a refusal pointer. Thus, changing this property is not sufficient for
jm to become blocking.
– If m lost some allocation, then it was the last vertex on W and thus, it
had a refusal pointer. According to out definition of P ′, all unsaturated
edges that dominate x at their job and are incident to a refusal pointer
at their machine already belonged to P ′. They may leave this set now
and be added to P , but P ∪ P ′ remains unchanged and thus, the best
proposal edge at m as well.
Update P ′. Θ2(x) may also increase, if an edge jm /∈ P ∪ P ′ is added to P ′
and it becomes the best proposal edge of m. Just like above, we check the three
criteria that have to be fulfilled by edges in P ′.
1. jm became unsaturated
– First we consider the case when jm ∈ W ∩R. But then jm is a refusal
edge and worst allocated edges of jobs are never in P ′.
– The other option is that x(jm) was reduced by m = m1. As mentioned
above, the only machine that refuses allocation is m1, the first vertex
on an alternating walk. Even if jm becomes a P ′-edge, m1 had a better
proposal edge at the beginning of the augmentation: the first edge of W .
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2. jm became better than the worst allocated edge of j
We can again rely on Lemma 2.
3. m gained a refusal edge
We supposed that set R is fix, no refusal pointer moves.
We have investigated the effects of the update operation on Θ(x) for all three
subsets of E(H(x)). Each round of the algorithm consists of the following three
steps: finding an alternating walk, augmenting along it and then updating H(x).
The first procedure does not change Θ(x), the second strictly decreases it, and
the last one never increases it. Thus, Θ(x) changes strictly monotonically in each
round. Since Θ(x) is integer-valued and bounded, our algorithm terminates.
Running time. The helper graph H(x) has at most as many edges and vertices
as G. In each iteration, Θ(x) develops. Consider first the case when only Θ2
changes. The best proposal edge of each machine m can walk along all δ(m)
edges of m. Since the procedure is monotone, |E| such steps can be executed
in total. Then, Θ1 has to develop. Just like Θ2, Θ1’s monotone behavior also
allows m steps in total. Yet it is not possible that both components need all the
m rounds. When a refusal pointer jm switches to a better edge jm′, most of the
elements in vector Θ2 remain unchanged.
Suppose the last augmentation along walkW shifted a single refusal pointer jm.
We investigate the change in Θ2. Clearly, Θ2 can be increased, since only lexico-
graphical monotonicity of Θ(x) can be shown. There are at most three special
machines on G: m, m′ and the last machine on W , if W is not a single cycle.
Machines not on W remain unchanged. Other machines on W reallocate some
allocation to better jobs than before. Thus, they develop their lexicographical
situation and keep their refusal edges. Machines with the same set of refusal
edges do not gain new possibly proposal edges, while machines with a better
lexicographical situation do not gain new blocking edges. Thus, all new edges
in P ∪ P ′ must be incident to one of the three machines mentioned above. Due
to the last operation along W that shifted r(j), m possibly ceases to have re-
fusal edges at all, thus, it may loose its possibly blocking edges. Regarding the
last machine on W , it loses allocation, and through that it may receive at most
|J | − 1 new blocking edges. These edges were all possibly blocking before, more-
over, they lead back toW . Similarly,m′, gaining a refusal edge, may become the
end vertex of new possibly blocking edges, but there are at most |J |−1 of them.
To summarize this: when Θ2 develops in one element, Θ1 may be increased in
at most one element by at most |J | − 1 < |V |.
This argumentation shows that the number of iterations can be bounded by
O(|V ||E|) from above, because Θ(x) cannot have more different states during
the execution of the algorithm. Next, we determine how much time is needed
to execute a single augmentation. Procedure FindWalk starts with choosing
any machine that has a blocking edge of type I. This can be done in O(|V |)
time. Adding the best proposal edge and the refusal pointer takes constant time,
if they are stored for each vertex. Since at most one vertex is visited twice by
the walk, after O(|V |) steps, W is chosen. Then, either of the two augmenting
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procedures is called. It modifies x on O(|V |) edges. At last, R,P, and P ′ are
updated. As explained above, the change in those sets involves at most O(|V |)
edges.
In total, the algorithm performs O(|V ||E|) rounds, each of them needs O(|V |)
time to be computed. In total, the accelerated Phase I algorithm runs inO(|V |2|E|)
time.
Accelerated second phase
The second phase can be accelerated in a very similar manner to the first phase.
Instead of describing this new algorithm directly and proving its correctness
using the same methods as above, we choose a shortcut. The main idea in this
subsection is that the accelerated second phase of our algorithm is actually the
accelerated first phase of the same algorithm on a slightly modified instance.
Thus, its correctness and running time have already been proved.
At the beginning of our argumentation we make these modifications on the
instance I given at the termination of the accelerated Phase I algorithm. We
show that the set of blocking edges of type I on the modified instance I ′ and
the set of blocking edges of type II on I coincide. Then we let our accelerated
Phase I algorithm run on I ′. At the end, we argument that its output is stable
on I.
Modified instance. After the termination of the first phase, an allocation
x0 is given so that all blocking edges are of type II. This input of the second
phase is modified the following way. A dummy job jd and edges between each
machine and jd are added to G. The capacity of these edges equals the maximum
quota amongst all machines, q(jd) is their sum. While jd’s preference list can
be chosen arbitrarily, the new edges stand at the bottom of the preference lists
of the machines. The new graph is called G′. Not only the graph, but also the
allocation x0 is slightly modified: machines with not yet filled up quota assign
all their free quota to jd. In this new allocation, x′0, all machines are saturated.
The new instance I ′ consists of G′, q′, c′, O′ and x′0.
As mentioned above, our goal is to perform Phase I operations on I ′. In
order to be able to do so, we swap the two color classes: jobs play a passive role,
while machines become the active players. Since each active vertex has a filled
up quota, all blocking edges are of type I on I ′.
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′
Note that I ′ was constructed in such a way that - regardless of the type
of blocking- each edge blocking x also blocks x′ and vice versa. This is due to
the fact that the only difference between the two instances is that machines’
free quota appears as allocation on their worst edge on I ′. The definition of
a blocking edge does not distinguish between those two notions. In particular,
given a specific allocation x0 with no blocking edge of type I, the set of Phase II
blocking edges on I and the set of Phase I blocking edges on I ′ trivially coincide.
Let us denote the output of the accelerated Phase I algorithm on I ′ by x′,
its restriction on E(G) by x.
Claim. Allocation x is stable on I.
Proof. Suppose edge jm blocks x. On I ′, jm is unsaturated and dominates x′
at both end vertices, hence jm blocks x′ as well. Since x′ is the output of the
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accelerated Phase I algorithm on I ′, jm is of type II. Our goal is to show by
induction that x′(m) = q(m) for all machines. Thus, a contradiction is derived,
because on I ′, no Phase II blocking edge may occur.
At start, x′(m) = q(m) for all machines. The key property of x′0 is that all
unsaturated edges that dominate x′0 at their (saturated) machine are not better
than their job’s worst edge in x′0. Otherwise, they would be blocking edges of
type I to x0. Adding a blocking edge jm to x′0 can therefore never result in a
refusal by the passive vertex j. Thus, after the first round, x′(m) = q(m) still
holds. Alternating walks are chosen in such a manner that jobs increase x′ only
on their best proposal edges. This guarantees that even after the first round, if
jm dominates the current allocation x′1 at m, it is not better than j’s worst edge
in x′1. From this on, induction applies.
The runtime of this phase may not exceed the runtime of the accelerated
Phase I algorithm, since the size of I ′ does not exceed the size of I significantly.
Algorithm Accelerated Phase I
while |P | > 0 do
FindWalk(H(x))
if W is a cycle then
AugmentCycle(W)
else
AugmentWalk(W)
end if
update R, P , P ′
end while
procedure FindWalk(H(x))
i := 1, W := ∅, find any m1 ∈M with a P -edge
while mi has a proposal edge and mi’s best proposal edge jimi∩W = ∅
do
W :=W ∪ jimi ∪ r(ji)
jimi+1 := r(ji), i := i+ 1
end while
end procedure
procedure AugmentCycle(W )
A := min{x(r(j)), x¯(p), x¯(p′)|r(j) ∈W ∩R, p, p′ ∈W ∩ (P ∪ P ′)}
for p, p′ ∈ W ∩ (P ∪ P ′) do
x(p) := x(p) +A, x(p′) := x(p′) +A
end for
for r(j) ∈W ∩R do
x(r(j)) := x(r(j)) −A
end for
25
end procedure
procedure AugmentWalk(W )
A := min{x(r(j)), x¯(p), x¯(p′), x¯(m1)+x(edges dominated by j1m1 at m1)|r(j) ∈
W ∩R, p, p′ ∈W ∩ (P ∪ P ′)}
if A− x¯(m1) > 0 then
m1 refuses A− x¯(m1) allocation from its worst edges
end if
for p, p′ ∈ W ∩ (P ∪ P ′) do
x(p) := x(p) +A, x(p′) := x(p′) +A
end for
for r(j) ∈W ∩R do
x(r(j)) := x(r(j)) −A
end for
end procedure
Recall the example instance again. Checking both proposal and both refusal
edges on W = (m1j3, j3m2,m2j4, j4m3), the residual capacity of m1, and the
allocation on m1’s worse edges, it turns out that A = 1. Thus, allocation x
shown on the figure above is obtained after the first augmentation. While j3m1
leaves P , j3m3 enters it. The set of refusal edges consists of all edges with
positive allocation value. P ′ is empty. In the second round, W is easy to find:
it is (m3j3, j3m1). After reassigning allocation of value 1 to j3m3, Phase I ends.
The allocation derived is not yet stable: j1m1 and j3m2 block it, but they are
both of type II.
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1
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2
2
1
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1
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3
Fig. 7. After the first round of the accelerated Phase I algorithm
Our method resembles the well-known notion of rotations [11]. They can be
used when deriving a stable solution from another, by finding an alternating
cycle of matching and non-matching edges and augmenting along them. In our
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algorithm, when we are searching for augmenting cycles or walks, we use an
approach similar to rotations: jobs candidate their edges better than their worst
positive edge, while machines choose the best out of them. However, two differ-
ences can be spotted right away. While rotations are always assigned to a stable
solution different from the job-optimal, our method works on unstable input.
Moreover, besides cycles we also augment along paths and walks.
Conclusion and open questions
We solved the problem of uncoordinated processes on stable allocation instances
algorithmically. Our first method is a deterministic better response algorithm
that finds a stable solution through executing myopic steps. In case of rational
input data, the existence of such an algorithm guarantees that random better
response strategies terminate with a stable solution with probability one. Anal-
ogous results are shown for best response dynamics. We also prove that random
best response strategies terminate in expected polynomial time on correlated
markets, even in the presence of irrational data. An accelerated version of our
first algorithm is provided as well. For any real-valued instance, it terminates
after O(|V |2|E|) steps with a stable allocation. We also show a counterexample
for a possible acceleration for the case of best response dynamics.
Future research may involve more complex stability problems from the paths-
to-stability point of view. For example, any of the problems listed after the figure
in Section 1.2 can be combined with our general setting of allocations.
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